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SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION: THE BACK DOOR
TO INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY
A motion for substantive consolidation or a motion to amend the
caption is usually raised by creditors in a bankruptcy case in or-
der to consolidate the assets and liabilities of related debtor en-
tites. Recently, creditors have raised these motions in an attempt
to consolidate the assets of a non-debtor with those of a debtor.
Two bankruptcy courts have permitted such consolidation, thus
making the non-debtor an involuntary debtor via a summary pro-
ceeding, without providing statutory protections normally afforded
involuntary debtors. Another bankruptcy court has refused to per-
mit consolidation of non-debtor and debtor assets and liabilities.
This Comment examines these conflicting decisions as well as sub-
stantive consolidation case law. The Comment questions the pro-
priety of the use of these motions.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of bankruptcy is two-fold: to give an insolvent debtor
a fresh financial start by relieving him of burdensome indebtedness,
and to equitably distribute the assets of the debtor among his credi-
tors." Liquidation2 and reorganizations are two of the processes used
1. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983); In re
Estate of Henry George Hiller, 240 F. Supp. 504, 504 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
2. In liquidation, the trustee collects debtor non-exempt property, converts the
property to cash, and distributes the cash to creditors. The debtor gives up all non-ex-
empt property owned at the time the petition is filed. Liquidation proceedings are gov-
erned by chapter seven of the Bankruptcy Code [hereinafter cited as the Code]. See
generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 726 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). A list of exempt property is
provided in 11 U.S.C. § 522 which allows the debtor to take advantage of state exemp-
tions. The federal alternatives listed in the Code exempt property of the debtor which is
necessary for ordinary life. The debtor may choose more liberal state exemptions (11
U.S.C. § 522(b)) or federal exemptions provided by law other than the Code or the
exemptions listed in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). The debtor must elect one set of exemptions or
another and cannot take advantage of all or some of the exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522
(1982 & Supp. 11 1984); 3 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 522.02 (15th ed.
1985).
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to achieve these ends. Creditors or debtors may initiate the bank-
ruptcy process. Debtors may voluntarily initiate the process by filing
a petition for relief.L4 Creditors may force the debtor into bankruptcy
by filing an involuntary petition.5 The involuntary method requires
creditors to satisfy standing requirements, and to prove at trial that
the alleged debtor is generally not paying its debts as they become
due.6
Recently, creditors have attempted to circumvent the protections
afforded involuntary debtors by the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)
and Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure by using either a motion for
"substantive consolidation" or a "motion to amend the caption" of a
bankruptcy case. 7 These motions allow creditors to treat the assets
and liabilities of non-debtor entities as if they were the assets and
liabilities of the original debtor.8 Consolidation is accomplished by
3. In a reorganization proceeding governed by chapter 11 of the Code, creditors
look to future earnings of the debtor. The debtor retains its assets and makes payments
to creditors pursuant to a court-approved plan. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1121-
1129 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
4. See 11 I.S.C. § 301 (1982).
5. See II U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984), which provides:
An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the bank-
ruptcy court of a petition under chapter 7 or 11 of this title-(l) by three or
more entities, each of which is either a holder of a claim against such person
that is not contingent as to liability or the subject [ofl a bona fide dispute, or
an indenture trustee representing such a holder, if such claims aggregate at
least $5,000 more than the value of any lien on property of the debtor securing
such claims held by the holders of such claims; (2) if there are fewer than 12
such holders, excluding any employee or insider of such person and any trans-
feree of a transfer that is voidable under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or
724(a) of this title, by one or more of such holders that hold in the aggregate
at least $5,000 of such claims.
II U.S.C. § 303(h) provides:
[A]fter trial, the court shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary
case under the chapter under which the petition was filed only if-(l) the
debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due
unless such debts that [sic] are the subject of a bona fide dispute; or (2) within
120 days before the date of the filing of the petition, a custodian other than a
trustee, receiver, or agent appointed or authorized to take charge of less than
substantially all of the property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a
lien against such property was appointed or took possession.
I 1 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1982 & Supp. 111984). See also In re Dill, 731 F.2d 629, 632 (9th
Cir. 1984) (§ 303(h) requires a more general showing of debtor financial condition and
debt structure than merely establishing a few unpaid debts).
7. See, e.g., In re 1438 Meridian Place, N.W., Inc., 15 Bankr. 89, 94-95 (Bankr.
D.C. 1981).
8. 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at 11100.06[1]. But cf. id. 11100.07 (regarding
procedural consolidation). FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015 advisory committee note regarding
procedural consolidation or joint administration distinguishes the two types of consolida-
tion in the following way:
Procedural consolidation applies to cases when the same debtor is named in
both a voluntary and involuntary petition, when a husband and wife have filed
a joint petition pursuant to § 302 of the code, and when two or more involun-
tary petitions are filed against the same debtor . . . . This rule does not deal
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an order of the court on the motion of any party in interest.9 Typi-
cally, substantive consolidation occurs in two ways: (i) by consolidat-
ing the assets of various entities through a plan of reorganization; 10
or (ii) by determining that the debtor is the alter ego of a separate
entity or by determining that two entities purportedly separate are in
fact not separate."1 This latter determination justifies changing the
caption of a case which allows the use of assets of the separate entity
for satisfaction of debtor debts."' Through these motions creditors
draw non-debtor entities into existing bankruptcy actions as involun-
tary debtors without satisfying the statutory and constitutional pro-
cedural requirements imposed on petitioners for involuntary relief.13
This Comment examines the propriety of the use of these motions
which make a non-debtor entity a debtor. It discusses the constitu-
tional and statutory procedural protections which apply to non-debt-
ors when such motions are utilized by creditors. This Comment ana-
lyzes the procedural adversary safeguards beyond those afforded by
bankruptcy motion practice which must apply when drawing a non-
debtor into a bankruptcy proceeding under chapter seven or chapter
eleven of the Bankruptcy Code. 4
with the consolidation of cases involving two or more separate debtors. Consoli-
dation as distinguished from joint administration is neither authorized nor pro-
hibited by this rule.
9. E.g., Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.
1966).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
11. Six components give rise to a presumption that a corporation has no separate
existence: (1) the corporation is under-capitalized; (2) the corporation is without separate
books; (3) its finances are not kept separate from individual finances, with individual
obligations paid by the corporation; (4) the corporation is used to promote fraud or ille-
gality; (5) corporate formalities are not followed; or (6) the corporation is merely a
sham. Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Harvey Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519
F.2d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 1975). Alter ego status is determined if an individual holds all or
most of the capital of a corporation and the corporation acts as the mere instrumentality
of the individual. In alter ego situations, the separate corporate entity will be disregarded
and the individual held liable. In re Lewellyn, 26 Bankr. 246, 252 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa
1982).
12. See, e.g., Meridian, 15 Bankr. at 89.
13. See, e.g., id.; In re Crabtree, 39 Bankr. 718 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).
14. A motion for substantive consolidation can also have severe ramifications on
creditors of the separate entities. This Comment will not focus on the effects of substan-
tive consolidation on creditors. For more information on that subject, see Tatelbaum, The
Multi-Tiered Corporate Bankruptcy and Substantive Consolidation-Do Creditors Lose
Rights and Protection?, 89 COMm. L.J. 285 (1984); Seligsen & Mandell, Multi-Debtor
Petitions-Consolidation of Debtors and Due Process of Law, 73 CoMm. L.J. 341
(1968).
BANKRUPTCY IS A DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY REQUIRING DUE
PROCESS PROTECTION
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
"there shall be no deprivation of life, liberty or property without due
process of law."'1 Procedural due process ensures the right to notice
of suit and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.' 6 Constitutional due process protection applies
to any significant property interest, including legal entitlements cre-
ated by state or federal law.1
7
Fundamentally, bankruptcy creates deprivation of property. Entry
of an order for relief 8 results in the taking of all debtor non-exempt
property, wherever located. Commencement of a voluntary or invol-
untary bankruptcy case results in the creation of an estate composed
of all legal or equitable property interests of the debtor as of the
commencement of the case.19 After an order for relief is entered,
proceeds from the estate are made available for distribution to credi-
tors.2 0 Due process considerations are especially important because
significant property interests are implicated in any bankruptcy
case.2 '
Procedural Requirements of Involuntary Petitions, Adversary
Proceedings, and Contested Matters Differ
A bankruptcy case commences with the filing of a voluntary or
involuntary petition.22 Any bankruptcy case may include a number
of adversary proceedings which are commenced by filing and serving
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
16. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
339 (1969).
17. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 86; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1969).
18. An order for relief operates as a determination of debtor status as a bankrupt,
and the filing of a voluntary petition operates as an order for relief. 11 U.S.C. § 301
(1982). The court orders relief in an involuntary case if the involuntary petition is not
contested. If the petition is contested, relief is ordered only after a trial in which require-
ments of I I U.S.C. § 303(h) are met. I I U.S.C. § 303(h) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). See
generally 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at 1 301.08.
19. II U.S.C. § 541(a)(l) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Section 541(a)(1) provides
that the commencement of a case under § 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate.
"Such estate is comprised of all of the following property wherever located: (1) [e]xcept
as provided in subsections (b), (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." Id. See also H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 367-68, and S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-83,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5868, 6323 (describing the broad
scope of § 541(a)(l) which includes all kinds of tangible and intangible property).
20. II U.S.C. §§ 724, 1121-1129 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
21. See generally In re Smith Corset Shops, Inc., 696 F.2d 971, 976 (1st Cir.
1982).
22. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303(b) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
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a summons and complaint,2 3 or a number of contested matters,
which are commenced by motion.24 Adversary proceedings, similar
in nature to litigation in federal courts, are governed by rules of pro-
cedure similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 Contested
matters, on the other hand, are commenced by motion of one or
more parties in interest and are governed by "motion practice"
rather than adversary rules of procedure.2" A motion for substantive
consolidation is considered a contested matter.27
Contested involuntary petitions and adversary proceedings provide
substantial opportunity for a party to receive notice, to respond, and
to be heard in a meaningful, adequate, and timely manner.2 8 Invol-
untary cases are initiated by creditors and can only be commenced
under chapter seven (liquidation) or chapter eleven (reorganiza-
tion).29 Creditors must satisfy one of two standing requirements to
file an involuntary petition. If the alleged debtor has more than
twelve unsecured creditors, at least three creditors with aggregate
claims of $5000 must file the petition. If the debtor has fewer than
twelve unsecured creditors, a single creditor with a claim of at least
$5000 may file the petition.30
23. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7003.
24. Id. R. 9014.
25. Id. R. 7001 (advisory committee note) which provides:
These Part VII rules are based on the premise that to the extent possible prac-
tice before bankruptcy courts and district courts should be the same. These
rules either incorporate or are adaptations of most of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. . . . The content and numbering of these Part VII rules correlates
to the content and numbering of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Most of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have a comparable Part VII rule.
26. Id. R. 9014 (advisory committee note) which provides:
Whenever there is an actual dispute, other than an adversary proceeding,
before the bankruptcy court, the litigation to resolve that dispute is a contested
matter. For example, the filing of an objection to a proof of claim, to a claim of
exemption, or to a disclosure statement creates a dispute which is a contested
matter. Even when an objection is not formally required, there may be a dis-
pute. If a party in interest opposes the amount of compensation sought by a
professional there is a dispute which is a contested matter.
27. E.g., Meridian, 15 Bankr. at 89.
28. See generally FED. R. BANKR. P. 1010, 1011, 7004, 7012; 11 U.S.C. § 303(d),
(h) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982). Section 303(a) provides: "An involuntary case
may be commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of this title and only against a person
. . . that may be a debtor under the chapter under which such case is commenced."
30. An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a petition under chapter 7 or 11 of this title-(l) by three
or more entities each of which is either a holder of a claim against such person
that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute, . . . if
such claims aggregate at least $5,000 more than the value of any lien on prop-
After the requisite number of qualified creditors file an involun-
tary petition, the alleged debtor has the right to file responsive plead-
ings or an answer, and may assert any affirmative defenses to the
petition.31 A trial is required before an order for relief may be en-
tered in a contested involuntary case. 32 In most cases, debtors retain
their property or continue to operate their businesses until after a
trial is held on the involuntary petition.33 At trial, creditors must
prove the debtor is generally not paying its debts as they become
due. 34 Failure to sustain the burden of proof on this issue results in
dismissal of the involuntary petition.35 The alleged debtor is entitled
to various remedies for damages sustained as a result of the petition.
These include compensatory damages, and punitive damages if the
petition was filed in bad faith.3 6
Similarly, an adversary proceeding provides significant procedural
safeguards for the defendant. It is commenced by filing a com-
plaint.37 A summons and notice of trial, or pre-trial, is issued and
served." The defendant then has thirty days from service of the
summons to answer and file responsive pleadings. 39 There is opportu-
nity to conduct discovery before trial.40 Creditors or parties in inter-
est who seek to obtain equitable or declaratory relief against a
erty of the debtor securing such claims held by the holders of such claims; (2) if
there are fewer than 12 such holders, excluding any employee or insider of such
person and any transferee of a transfer that is voidable ... by one or more of
such holders that hold in the aggregate at least $5,000 of such claims.
II U.S.C. § 303(b) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
31. "The debtor, or a general partner in a partnership debtor that did not join in
the petition, may file an answer to a petition under this section." 11 U.S.C. § 303(d)
(1982). See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 1011(b), (d) (regarding defenses, objections, and
claims).
32. I1 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
33. 1i U.S.C. § 303(f) (1982) provides: "except to the extent that the court or-
ders otherwise, and until an order for relief in the case, any business of the debtor may
continue to operate, and the debtor may continue to use, acquire, or dispose of property
as if an involuntary case concerning the debtor had not been commenced." See also 11
U.S.C. § 303(h) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (regarding exceptions to this general rule).
34. See supra note 6.
35. E.g., In re R.N. Salem Corp., 29 Bankr. 424, 425 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
36. I1 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1982). Section 303(i) provides:
If the court dismisses a petition under this section other than on consent of all
petitioners and the debtor, and if the debtor does not waive the right to judg-
ment under this subsection, the court may grant judgment-(1) against all the
petitioners and in favor of the debtor for (A) costs; (B) a reasonable attorney's
fee; or (C) any damages proximately caused by the taking of possession of the
debtor's property by a trustee appointed under subsection (g) of this section or
under section 1104 of this title; or (2) against any petitioner that filed the
petition in bad faith for (A) any damages proximately caused by such filing; or
(B) punitive damages.
37. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7003.
38. Id. R. 7004.
39. Id. R. 7012.
40. Id. R. 7026-7037.
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debtor, or obtain property of the estate, must do so within the con-
fins of an adversary proceeding. 1
ontested matters are summary in nature and are often heard on
short notice 42 without an evidentiary hearing.43 As a contested mat-
ter, a substantive consolidation motion, or a motion to amend the
caption, enables creditors to bypass requirements of contested invol-
untary petitions and adversary proceedings, thus circumventing im-
portant due process safeguards and legal entitlements possessed by
all alleged debtors."
41. Id. R. 7001, 7004.
42. See id. R. 9006(d), (e) which provide:
(d) For motions-affidavits. A written motion, other than one which may be
heard ex parte, and notice of any hearing shall be served not later than five
days before the time specified for such hearing, unless a different period is fixed
by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be
made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the
affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in
Rule 9023, opposing affidavits may be served not later than one day before the
hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some other time.
(e) Time of Service. Service of process and service of any paper other than
process or of notice by mail is complete on mailing.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014 provides:
In a contested matter in a case under the Code not otherwise governed by these
rules, relief shall be requested by motion, and reasonable notice and opportu-
nity for hearing shall be afforded the party against whom relief is sought. No
response is required under this rule unless the court orders an answer to a
motion. The motion shall be served in the manner provided for service of a
summons and complaint by Rule 7004, and, unless the court otherwise directs,
the following rules shall apply: 7021, 7025, 7026, 7028-7037, 7041, 7042,
7052, 7054-7056, 7062, 7064, 7069, and 7071. The court may at any stage in a
particular matter direct that one or more of the other rules in Part VII shall
apply. A person who desires to perpetuate testimony may proceed in the same
manner as provided in Rule 7027 for the taking of a deposition before an ad-
versary proceeding. The clerk shall give notice to the parties of the entry of any
order directing that additional rules of Part VII are applicable or that certain
of the rules of Part VII are not applicable. The notice shall be given within
such time as is necessary to afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to com-
ply with the procedures made applicable by the order.
43. See 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (1982 and Supp. 11 1984) which provides:
"After notice and a hearing," or similar phrase-(A) means after such notice
as is appropriate in the particular circumstances, and such opportunity for a
hearing as is appropriate in the particular circumstances; but (B) authorizes an
act without an actual hearing if such notice is given properly and if-
(i) such a hearing is not requested timely by a party in interest; or (ii) there is
insufficient time for a hearing to be commenced before such act must be done
and the court authorizes such act . . ..
See also TEMP. LOCAL R. U.S. BANKR. CT., S.D. CA 9013-9015; LOCAL R. U.S. BANKR.
CT. C.D. CA 904D.
44. See, e.g., Meridian, 15 Bankr. at 94-95.
Substantive Consolidation as a Due Process Loophole
Substantive consolidation is usually employed to consolidate the
assets and liabilities of affiliated debtor corporations or partnerships.
For example, it may be used to bring a parent corporation into a
pending bankruptcy case involving a subsidiary, or to consolidate two
pending cases involving corporate affiliates. Substantive consolidation
is also used when a corporation functions as the mere instrumental-
ity of individual shareholder debtors.45 In consolidation actions,
bankruptcy courts can disregard separate corporate entities to reach
additional assets for the satisfaction of debts. This practice is an ex-
ample of "piercing the corporate veil."46
The substantive consolidation mechanism is troublesome and ques-
tionable when used to join a non-debtor as a debtor in a pending
chapter seven or chapter eleven case.47 For example, the creditors in
a pending case involving corporation A may move to substantively
consolidate the assets and liabilities of corporation B, a non-debtor.
If this motion is granted, B is effectively made a debtor without the
opportunity to answer an involuntary petition, respond to a com-
plaint filed as part of an adversary proceeding, take part in a trial,
or, depending upon the motion practice in any particular court, pre-
sent live testimony in its own defense. Creditors of A would then
have the assets of B consolidated, without satisfying the standing re-
quirements of 11 U.S.C. § 303(b), or proving that B is not generally
paying its debts as they come due.48 The procedural requirements of
involuntary petitions and adversary proceedings are, therefore, by-
passed through the use of substantive consolidation motions.49
CONSOLIDATION UNDER THE VEIL-PIERCING THEORY
When faced with a motion for substantive consolidation, bank-
ruptcy courts generally explore three areas: (i) whether the court has
the power to consolidate; (ii) whether the rights of creditors will be
protected or threatened if consolidation is granted; and (iii) whether
the existence of the corporate entity may be disregarded.50 Jurisdic-
tion is typically satisfied under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), which gives the
court equitable power to issue any order necessary or appropriate to
45. 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at 1100.06[1].
46. In re Continental Vending Machine Corp., 517 F.2d 997, 1000 (2d Cir.
1975); Kheel, 369 F.2d at 845.
47. In re Alpha & Omega Realty Inc., 36 Bankr. 416 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1984)
(wherein the court refused to grant a motion for substantive consolidation of the estate of
a general partnership, a non-debtor, with that of the debtor corporation).
48. See generally Crabtree, 39 Bankr. at 718; Meridian, 15 Bankr. at 89. Both
courts stated satisfaction of these requisites was unnecessary.
49. See generally Crabtree, 39 Bankr. at 718; Meridian, 15 Bankr. at 89.
50. Lewellyn, 26 Bankr. at 250.
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carry out the provisions of title eleven. 1
Consolidation affects substantive rights. Consequently, courts be-
gin with the premise that the power to consolidate should be used
sparingly.52 Consolidation may prejudice creditors who have dealt
only with one debtor and have no knowledge of its interrelationship
with others. 3 Proponents of consolidation must therefore show that
any economic prejudice to creditors is outweighed by the cost neces-
sary to unscramble the interrelationships of inter-entity transac-
tions.5 4 Put differently, proponents of consolidation must show that
the economic prejudice of continued debtor separateness outweighs
the economic prejudice of consolidation.5
Finally, courts consider various circumstances in which the corpo-
rate entity may be disregarded and the assets and liabilities of sepa-
rate entities pooled. Courts look at the following factors to decide
whether to pierce the corporate veil: (i) the degree of difficulty in
segregating and ascertaining individual assets and liabilities; (ii) the
presence or absence of consolidated financial statements; (iii) the
profitability of consolidation of a single physical location; (iv) the
commingling of assets in business functions; (v) the unity of interest
and ownership between various corporate entities; (vi) the existence
of parent and intercorporate guarantees on loans; and (vii) the trans-
fer of assets without formal observance of corporate formalities. 6
51. I1 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982 & Supp. If 1984).
52. In re Flora Mir Candy Corp., 432 F.2d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir. 1970).
53. Kheel, 369 F.2d at 847. Rights of two separate creditor groups are impli-
cated. Creditors of the debtor entity ("A") may desire access to assets of the non-debtor
entity ("B"). This would inevitably impair or dilute the ability of B's creditors to satisfy
their debts. For example, in any bankruptcy case certain claims have priority over others.
Persons essential to the administration of the estate such as attorneys, trustees, account-
ants, as well as lenders to the bankrupt have a preferred position and are paid before
other creditors are paid. Because the debtor in the pending proceeding will have incurred
administrative expenses which must be paid first, the creditors of the non-debtor will be
forced to subordinate their claims to the expenses of the already established administra-
tion. They will also be forced to commingle their claims with creditors of the debtor. 11
U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
54. Lewellyn, 26 Bankr. at 251.
55. In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 Bankr. 230, 234 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
It must be recognized and affirmatively stated that substantive consolidation
... threatens to prejudice the rights of creditors .... This is so because
separate debtors will almost always have different ratios of assets to liabilities.
Thus, the creditors of a debtor whose asset-to-liability ratio is higher than that
of its affiliated debtor must lose to the extent that the asset-to-liability ratio of
the merged estates will be lower.
Id.
56. In re Vecco Construction Indus., 4 Bankr. 407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
The same or similar analysis was used in In re Food Fair, 10 Bankr. 123, 126 (Bankr.
Analysis of these factors frequently requires presentation of evidence
regarding the actions of corporate officers and directors. 57 Moreover,
if the corporation acts as the alter ego or mere instrumentality of an
individual (the individual holds all or most of the capital stock of the
corporation and the corporation acts as the instrumentality of the
individual), the corporate entity may be disregarded and the individ-
ual held personally liable for corporate obligations. 5
The party seeking consolidation must establish the need for con-
solidation59 and must prove by a preponderance of evidence that cor-
porate formalities should be disregarded. 60 Parties opposed to consol-
idation may argue that the benefits of consolidation do not outweigh
the potential harm of consolidation. 61 For example, if a creditor
proves that he looked only to the credit of one debtor, and he is
certain to suffer harm because assets to satisfy his claim will be dis-
sipated, substantive consolidation may appropriately be denied. 2
No specific arrangement of facts will mandate consolidation in
any particular instance; each case is sui generise3 However, certain
factual circumstances are consistently evident in court decisions in-
volving substantive consolidation. Most consolidation cases based on
alter ego determinations involved consolidation of two affiliated enti-
ties which were already debtors.6 4 Only three recent cases involved
consolidation of a debtor and non-debtor entity. These cases, how-
ever, reached different conclusions. Two courts permitted consolida-
tion of non-debtor entities by motion while another court did not per-
mit consolidation.
Cases Permitting Consolidation of Debtor and Non-Debtor
Entities
In Re 1438 Meridian Place, N.W., Inc.
Creditors in In Re 1438 Meridian Place, N.W., Inc.,6 5 filed a mo-
tion to amend the caption of the voluntary chapter eleven petition
filed by the debtor, and to pierce the corporate veil. The creditors
alleged two individual non-debtors were the alter egos of the debtor
S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Richton Int'l Corp., 12 Bankr. 555, 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981);
In re Luth, 28 Bankr. 564, 566 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983); Meridian, 15 Bankr. at 96-97.
But cf. In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 593 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1979) (test employed).
57. E.g., Vecco, 4 Bankr. at 407; Meridian, 15 Bankr. at 89; Luth, 28 Bankr. at
564.
58. Lewellyn, 26 Bankr. at 252.
59. Snider, 18 Bankr. at 238.
60. In re G&L Packing Co., 20 Bankr. 789, 805 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982).
61. Snider, 18 Bankr. at 238.
62. E.g., Flora Mir, 432 F.2d at 1063 (in which this argument was successful).
63. Snider, 18 Bankr. at 234.
64. See infra note 97.
65. 15 Bankr. 89 (Bankr. D.C. 1981).
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and of several non-debtor corporations. The court granted the credi-
tor, motion based upon documentary and testimonial evidence ad-
duced at an extended hearing. The court order resulted in the consol-
idation of six corporate and two individual non-debtors with the
debtor corporation.
The responding parties argued the court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion over the non-debtors. They claimed the creditors should have
initiated either an adversary proceeding or filed an involuntary peti-
tion against the non-debtors. The court dismissed this argument by
relying on the broad jurisdictional powers granted to bankruptcy
courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1471. Section 1471 gave the court jurisdic-
tion over all debtor property wherever located. The court also relied
on its broad powers as a court of equity. The court rejected the argu-
ment that an adversary proceeding was required, stating that under
Bankruptcy Rule 701 the relief requested did not require an adver-
sary proceeding. 66
In addressing the debtor argument that an involuntary petition
was required to join the non-debtors, the court stressed that the cred-
itors bringing the motion were creditors only of 1438 Meridian
Place, N.W., Inc. Consequently, they could not comply with the re-
quirements of 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) regarding standing to qualify as
creditors of the non-debtors. Because the creditors could not satisfy
the standing requirements, an involuntary petition could not possibly
be filed and, therefore, was not necessary to accomplish the aim of
the moving parties.6 7
In Re Crabtree
Creditors of an alleged involuntary debtor moved to amend the
caption of an involuntary petition to include a non-debtor corpora-
tion. The motion was made and granted after the order for relief on
the involuntary petition had been entered by the court.68
The alleged debtor argued that amending the caption to consoli-
66. Id. at 91, 94. Meridian relied on FED. R. BANKR. P. 701. This was superceded
by FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001. Rule 701 limited adversary proceedings to actions to:
(1) recover money or property, other than a proceeding under Rule 220 or
Rule 604, (2) determine the validity, priority or extent of a lien or other inter-
est in property, (3) sell property free of a lien or other interest for which the
holder can be compelled to take a money satisfaction, (4) object to or revoke a
discharge, (5) obtain an injunction, (6) obtain relief from a stay as provided in
Rule 401 or 601, (7) determine the dischargeability of a debt . ...
67. Meridian, 15 Bankr. at 95.
68. In re Crabtree, 39 Bankr. 718, 723 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).
date the debtor and its alter ego required the creditors to first file an
involuntary petition against the non-debtor corporation and then
move to consolidate the two pending cases. The court found this an
acceptable, but not exclusive method available to creditors to add
alter ego to petitions. Relying on Meridian, the Crabtree court held
the creditor motion to amend the caption was acceptable simply be-
cause the non-debtor corporation was the alter ego and instrumental-
ity of the individual debtor. The court noted that since the individual
was the alleged debtor and owned all the shares of the corporate
stock, the corporation itself was property of the estate. Thus, the cor-
porate assets were subject to the claims of the individual debtor in
any event.69
The court also stated that any defenses by the non-debtor corpora-
tion could be raised at trial. Consolidation occurred, however, after
the order for relief had been entered in the involuntary case.70 Con-
sequently, the corporate non-debtor was declared bankrupt and its
assets joined with those of the individual debtor. This consolidation
occurred without the creditors of the individual debtor satisfying
standing requirements usually necessary to bring an action against a
corporate non-debtor, and without proving the non-debtor corpora-
tion was not paying its debts as they became due.71 There was no
opportunity to assert defenses which would otherwise have been
available to the non-debtor corporation at the involuntary trial since
the involuntary order for relief had already been entered.
The court cited several cases which permitted amendments to an
involuntary petition after action had been concluded on the original
petition. Two of these cases involved involuntary petitions which
were originally dismissed for failure to sufficiently allege claims for
which relief could be granted. After dismissal, amendments to the
petitions were allowed and the proceedings were reinstated.72 In
these two cases, the reinstatement of the petitions allowed the al-
leged debtors sufficient opportunity to file an answer and take part in
a trial. Amending a caption after entry of an order for relief, how-
ever, makes the non-debtor a debtor without providing any of these
procedural safeguards.
73
Another case discussed in Crabtree allowed realignment of parties
and amendment of the pleadings after judgment. The court held
that, under certain circumstances, rule fifteen of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure could permit realignment of the parties after
69. Id. at 721.
70. Id. at 723.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b), (h) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
72. In re Charmar Inv., 475 F.2d 560 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823
(1973); Kroell v. N.Y. Ambassador, 108 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1939).
73. Crabtree, 39 Bankr. at 723.
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judgment, but only if all parties had notice of the issues being tried
and no prejudice would result.7 4 The Crabtree court recognized that
each party in the case before it received adequate notice of what the
motion entailed and had an adequate opportunity to present evidence
on the issues raised by the motion.
7 5
The Case Prohibiting Consolidation of Debtor and Non-
Debtor Entities: In Re Alpha & Omega Realty, Inc.
In Re Alpha & Omega Realty, Inc.7 1 contained facts similar to
Crabtree and Meridian, but the court reached a different result. The
debtor was not a debtor-in-possession.7 The bankruptcy trustee re-
quested consolidation of the assets of a non-debtor partnership into
the estate of the debtor, asserting that Meridian supported the con-
solidation motion. The court found Meridian unpersuasive. It ques-
tioned the Meridian court's reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 148178 as con-
ferring jurisdiction. In view of the Supreme Court decision in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.,7 9 the
Alpha & Omega court found the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts
was not as broad as previously thought.8 0
74. Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 533 F.2d 325, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
75. Crabtree, 39 Bankr. at 722-23.
76. Alpha & Omega, 36 Bankr. at 416.
77. 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at t 1101.02. A "debtor in possession" refers to
a debtor who remains in possession of his property during the pendency of a bankruptcy
case. Unless the court appoints an interim trustee, the debtor remains in possession until
an order for relief is entered.
78. Actually, 11 U.S.C. § 1471 was relied upon by the Meridian court. 15 Bankr.
at 94.
79. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The plurality in Marathon held that § 241(a) of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act was unconstitutional because it violated constitutional separa-
tion of powers. Section 241(a) removed most of the essential attributes of judicial power
from the Article III district court, and vested these attributes in a non-Article III ad-
junct (the bankruptcy court). Such a jurisdictional grant was not permissable under con-
gressional power to create adjuncts to Article III courts.
Specifically, Marathon addressed whether the new bankruptcy court, whose judges did
not possess Article III status, could adjudicate claims based on state-created rights. The
Supreme Court held that the state law contract claim involved in Marathon could not be
adjudicated by anyone other than an Article III judge.
80. The Marathon decision threw the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts into ques-
tion. In July 1984 Congress enacted a new jurisdictional framework for bankruptcy
courts. Thus far, no court has addressed bankruptcy court jurisdiction over substantive
consolidation matters in view of these amendments. Relied upon by the Meridian court
and questioned by the Alpha & Omega court, 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982), however, was
adopted in these amendments in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (Supp. 11 1984). This provision,
like its predecessor, gives the bankruptcy court jurisdiction over all debtor property wher-
ever located. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. I 1984).
Furthermore, the court questioned the Meridian court's conclusion
that non-debtors could be declared involuntary debtors through the
use of the veil-piercing theory. The court found this theory especially
suspect when such action was raised by motion rather than through
an adversary proceeding or involuntary petition with their attendant
procedural protections. Finally, the court concluded that due process
was not afforded to the non-debtor or to the creditors of the non-
debtor under the type of analysis employed by the Meridian court.81
The analysis in Alpha & Omega was similar to that erployed
under the former Bankruptcy Act82 in cases which held that assets of
non-debtor alter ego entities could not be consolidated in a summary
(motion) proceeding, but required instead, a plenary (trial) proceed-
ing.8 3 Under the Bankruptcy Act, bankruptcy courts had summary
jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies relating to property over
which they had actual or constructive possession. The test of this
jurisdiction was not title to the property by the bankrupt but posses-
sion by the bankrupt at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed. 4
The court was without power to summarily adjudicate adversary
claims to title to property that was not in actual or constructive pos-
session of the court, unless the parties consented. Absent consent, a
plenary suit conducted by the district court was required.
8 5
In Suhl v. Bumb,88 a case decided under the Bankruptcy Act, the
trustee of a corporation claimed that assets in the possession of two
individuals were in the constructive possession of the bankrupt cor-
poration. The trustee argued the individuals were alter egos of the
bankrupt corporation. The bankruptcy court agreed, finding the indi-
vidual claims to the assets frivolous. Absent a bona fide claim by the
individuals, the property was considered to be in the constructive
possession of the court. The court, therefore, had summary jurisdic-
tion to resolve the conflicting claims to the property. Further, be-
cause the individuals were alter egos of the corporation, their assets
could be administered with those of the bankrupt corporation.
88
81. Alpha & Omega, 36 Bankr. at 417.
82. The Bankruptcy Reform Act was enacted in 1978 as Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92
Stat. 2549, and is now commonly referred to as the Bankruptcy Code. Prior legislation,
originally enacted in 1898 and superceded by the Bankruptcy Code, continues to be re-
ferred to as the Bankruptcy Act. In 1984, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, were enacted in the wake of
Marathon. These amendments changed the Bankruptcy Code as well as the judicial sys-
tem. See generally I W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at 1 1.01 nn. 1,2.
83. See, e.g., Suhl v. Bumb, 348 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1965).
84. Magnolia Pet Co. v. Thompson, 309 U.S. 478, 481 (1940).
85. Magnolia Pet Co. v. Thompson, 106 F.2d 217, 222 (8th Cir. 1939), revd on
other grounds, 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
86. 348 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965).
87. Id. at 870.
88. Id. at 871.
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On appeal, the individual appellants argued the bankruptcy court
had exceeded its power by exercising summary jurisdiction. 9 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that the alter ego and tortious conversion of
funds allegations required a plenary proceeding. A summary pro-
ceeding would sacrifice the rights to refute such allegations at a full
trial. The Ninth Circuit could not accept this abrogation of the indi-
vidual's right to a plenary proceeding and reversed the decision of
the bankruptcy court.90
A similar decision was reached in Mashburn v. Williams.91 The
bankruptcy trustee sought to include property claimed by individuals
in the bankrupt estate, thereby forcing these individuals to file
schedules in bankruptcy via a summary procedure. The trustee ar-
gued the bankrupt corporation was a sham, and the court should
pierce the corporate veil, make the individual non-debtors parties to
the action, and require them to file schedules in bankruptcy. Relying
on Suhl, the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court could not
use a summary procedure to pierce the corporate veil and require
these individuals to file schedules in bankruptcy which would disclose
their assets to creditors. Where the individuals asserted absolute title
to the property sought by the trustee, and the bankrupt corporation
was never in possession of the property, a plenary suit was required.
Anything less would violate the individual's right to a plenary
proceeding. 92
Reconciliation of the Conflicting Decisions
These decisions cannot be fully reconciled. In Crabtree, assets of a
non-debtor corporation were included in the debtor estate as assets
of the individual debtor. The debtor owned 100% of the shares of the
corporation, controlled the corporation, and provided personal guar-
antees for corporate debts.93 The vehicle used to include the individ-
ual debtor corporate holdings in the estate was substantive consolida-
tion.94 This was actually unnecessary given the broad construction
89. Id. at 874.
'90. Id. at 872-74. But see Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S.
215 (1941).
91. 384 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1967).
92. Id. at 364.
93. Crabtree, 39 Bankr. at 720. It is important to note that although corporate
stock may be included in the assets of the estate of an individual, its value is limited to
shareholder equity or assets remaining after payment of corporate debts. 11 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5083 (1971).
94. Crabtree, 39 Bankr. at 721.
generally applied to section 541 of the Code95 regarding composition
of the estate, as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d),96 enabling the court to
exercise jurisdiction over all debtor property wherever located.
Meridian court analysis permitting consolidation parallels those
cases involving consolidation of two pending bankruptcies of related
corporate debtors or involving consolidation under a plan of reorgan-
ization. 7 However, Meridian and Alpha & Omega involve creditor
attempts to draw non-debtors into bankruptcy as involuntary debtors
using substantive consolidation motions. The involuntary non-debtors
had no opportunity to utilize procedural due process protections of
an involuntary petition or an adversary proceeding. The Meridian
court allowed consolidation; the Alpha & Omega court did not.
This conflict becomes especially important when re-examining the
veil-piercing analysis. The vast majority of prior cases dealt with
consolidating assets of existing debtor entities. The greatest concern
of courts deciding these veil-piercing cases was to avoid creditor
prejudice in consolidation. 8 Prejudice to the debtor entities was not
a factor because the two entities were already in bankruptcy. Their
property was already subject to court jurisdiction for disbursement
to creditors. Their property had already been taken with procedural
due process protection.99 However, when a non-debtor is drawn into
an existing bankruptcy case and is made a debtor, the taking ad-
versely affects both the non-debtor entity as well as the non-debtor's
creditors and equity interest holders. 100
Courts readily acknowledge that consolidation is no mere instru-
ment of procedural convenience. It vitally affects substantive
95. Section 541(a)(1) defines the "estate" as comprised of all the following prop-
erty, wherever located:
all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commence-
ment of the case. Although these statutes could be read to limit the estate to
those "interests of the debtor in property" at the time of the filing of the peti-
tion, we view them as a definition of what is included in the estate, rather than
as a limitation.
Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (Supp. 11 1984).
97. See generally Luth, 28 Bankr. at 565 (involving the substantive consolidation
of two pending proceedings of two related debtors); Lewellyn, 26 Bankr. at 250 (in which
trustees of two pending proceedings sought to consolidate); G&L Packing, 20 Bankr. at
805 (in which an adversary proceeding was filed as part of an involuntary case against a
corporate subsidiary); Snider, 18 Bankr. at 230 (in which creditors requested consolida-
tion of six voluntary corporate debtors); Food Fair, 10 Bankr. at 127 (in which several
voluntary debtors requested consolidation); Richton Int'l, 12 Bankr. at 555 (in which
three debtors requested consolidation). But cf. In re Tureaud, 45 Bankr. 658 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 1985) (involving consolidation of individual debtor and corporate affiliate
non-debtors with the consent of non-debtors).
98. See generally Continental Vending, 517 F.2d at 997; Flora Mir, 432 F.2d at
1060; Kheel, 369 F.2d at 845.
99. See supra note 97.
100. See supra notes 53-55.
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rights.10l The admonition found in most veil-piercing decisions relied
on in both Crabtree and Meridian that "consolidation should be used
sparingly because of the unfair treatment of creditors,"'102 applies
with even greater force to non-debtor consolidation. The certainty of
substantial injury and Prejudice to the name and property of the
non-debtor entity mandate that full due process protections be af-
forded to the non-debtor entity as well as to its creditors. 0 3 Ignoring
this prejudice and harm to the non-debtor by failing to distinguish
cases which do not involve non-debtor entities is clearly shortsighted.
The potential for harm to the non-debtor entity is as significant as
the potential prejudice to the creditors of non-debtor entities. 10 4
DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS COMPARED
There are two types of proceedings in bankruptcy litigation: adver-
sary proceedings and contested matters. Contested matters are gen-
erally non-adversarial in nature. They are procedurally less formal
than an adversary proceeding. 0 5 When a substantive consolidation
motion is raised in the course of a bankruptcy case, it is treated as a
contested matter, governed by the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
beginning at rule 9014. Certain adversary rules apply in contested
matters, 0 6 and a court may direct the application of the rules gov-
erning adversary proceedings during the course of a contested mat-
ter.0 7 However, important notice and hearing differences still exist
among contested matters, adversary proceedings, and involuntary
cases.
In contested matters, notice is accomplished by personal service or
101. Flora Mir, 432 F.2d at 1060.
102. See, e.g., Vecco, 4 Bankr. at 410; Flora Mir, 432 F.2d at 1063; Kheel, 369
F.2d at 847.
103. Seligsen & Mandell, supra note 14.
104. Cf. In re Covey, 650 F.2d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 1981) (involving a voluntary
debtor); Salem, 29 Bankr. at 431 (involving involuntary debtors and the resulting stigma
of bankruptcy).
105. See, e.g., In re Rath Packing Co., 38 Bankr. 552, 555 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1984). See also D.R. COWAN, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.19 (Supp. 1984).
106. Part VII rules applicable to contested matters are as follows: FED. R. BANKR.
P. 7004 (Process, Service of Summons, Complaint), 7021 (Misjoinder and Non-joinder of
parties), 7025 (Substitution of Parties), 7026-7037 (Rules governing discovery), 7041
(Dismissal), 7042 (Consolidation of adversary proceedings/separate trials), 7052 (Find-
ings on the Record), 7054 (Judgment costs), 7055 (Default), 7056 (Summary judg-
ment), 7062 (Stay of Proceedings to enforce a judgment), 7071 (process on behalf of and
against persons not parties).
107. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014.
service by mail setting forth the time and place of the hearing.10 8 An
adversary proceeding requires filing a formal complaint and service
of a summons. 10 9 Similarly, an involuntary petition requires filing a
petition, satisfying standing requirements, and serving the petition
and summons.1" 0
In contested matters, notice of the hearing must be served not
later than five days before the hearing. Even less time is required if
the hearing is to be ex parte."' Both personal service and service by
first class mail are permitted. Service by mail is considered complete
when notice is mailed." Thus, it is possible that the opposing party
may not receive actual notice until two days before the hearing, if at
all. A response to the motion is not required unless the court orders
one, although the opposing party may elect to file one."*3
In contrast, service of a summons and complaint in an adversary
proceeding must be complete ten days after issuance of the sum-
mons. The defendant must answer the complaint or file responsive
pleadings within thirty days of issuance of the summons." 4 In invol-
untary cases, debtors have twenty days after issuance of the sum-
mons and involuntary petition, to answer or file responsive pleadings.
As in adversary proceedings, service of the summons and involuntary
petition must be complete ten days after issuance of the summons."15
Several practical problems exist with the notice provisions which
apply to contested matters. Since notice may be mailed five days
before the hearing date, service by mail invites abuse by the moving
party. Moreover, five days notice leaves little time to prepare a de-
fense, obtain legal counsel, or make arrangements to personally ap-
pear. Finally, unless the court orders an answer, or the responding
party has time to consult counsel and file responsive pleadings, the
only defense of the adverse party against the consolidation motion
must be formulated on short notice. This procedure virtually guaran-
tees the non-debtor will be forced to seek discretionary relief from
the court for a continuance to file responsive pleadings.
Hearing requirements are also troublesome. Substantive consolida-
tion motion practice requires a hearing. Hearings do not always per-
mit presentation of live testimony." 6 The issues resolved at consoli-
dation hearings are serious: whether under the factual
108. Id. R. 9006.
109. Id. R. 7004.
ii0. Id. R. 1010, 7004; FED. R. Civ. P. 4; 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1982 & Supp. II
1984).
III. II U.S.C. § 102(1)(B)(ii) (1982); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(c)(1).
112. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(e).
113. Id. R. 9014.
114. Id. R. 7004(0, 7012(a).
115. Id. R. 1011(b), 7004(0.
116. I1 U.S.C. § 102(l)(B) (1982).
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circumstances, as established by the evidence, the corporate veil
should be pierced, the non-debtor declared a debtor, and the non-
debtor assets consolidated with those of the debtor.117 Ordinarily, a
person may become a debtor involuntarily only after a full-scale trial
in the course of an involuntary case. It is doubtful whether a deter-
mination with such far-reaching effect can fairly be made in the
course of a hearing on a contested matter.
Requirements of procedural due process must be satisfied when-
ever creditors seek to include the assets of a non-debtor in a pending
bankruptcy case. 118 Procedural due process requires notice reasona-
bly calculated to inform interested parties of the pendency of the
action and to give them an opportunity to present their objections.
Such notice must reasonably convey required information and allow
a reasonable time for interested parties to appear and respond.1 9
Five days notice of a substantive consolidation hearing may reasona-
bly convey the required information. However, this does not provide
a reasonable time to present objections, or to prepare a response,
particularly in light of the significant effect substantive consolidation
has on the property of the non-debtor and the creditors of the non-
debtor.
Procedural due process also requires the opportunity to be heard
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 20 Although non-
debtors have the opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of
their property,121 the manner in which rights are adjudicated in a
contested manner stands in stark contrast to procedural protections
associated with the full-scale plenary trials. It is questionable
whether non-debtors or their creditors are heard in a "meaningful
manner" under the limited framework of contested matter
procedures.
The Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Pro-
cedure violate the due process clause when they are found to be so
arbitrary and unreasonable as to be incompatible with notions of
fundamental fairness.1 22 However, due process must be assessed
117. Meridian, 15 Bankr. at 92.
118. See Seligsen & Mandell, supra note 14, at 346 (which examined the impor-
tance of procedural due process for creditors of non-debtor entities).
119. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
120. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80.
121. Id. at 81; Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264. These cases
examined the importance of being heard prior to a deprivation of property.
122. In re Joyner, 7 Bankr. 596, 599 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980); In re Bruntz, 10
Bankr. 444, 447 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1981).
within the particular circumstances of each case. 123 When a non-
debtor is declared a debtor without the benefit of a full-scale trial,
consolidation is arbitrary, unreasonable, and incompatible with fun-
damental fairness.
Congress intended bankruptcy courts to act as a shield for debtors,
not as a sword for creditors.1 24 This intention reflects two concerns.
One is the stigma attached to bankruptcy. Some predictable conse-
quences of becoming a bankrupt debtor include the inability to ob-
tain credit, unavailability of goods except on a cash basis, and dam-
age to the business reputation of the debtor.12 5 If the debtor
voluntarily chooses the bankruptcy option, these consequences are
known, and the risks of harm to the debtor are determined to be less
than the harm of not filing at all.126 Involuntary debtors and non-
debtors joined by substantive consolidation have no such option.
Congress recognized this potential for damage by providing remedies
to the alleged involuntary debtor if damaged by an involuntary peti-
tion that is ultimately dismissed.
12 7
The second concern which merits due process protection is the
complete taking of debtor property after an order for relief is
granted.128 Statutory procedural protections were generally designed
to guard against such property takings without due process. These
protections are embodied in standing requirements, burdens of proof,
notice and hearing requirements, and the mandate that a trial be
held before a person can involuntarily be brought into bankruptcy.129
Such protections are legal entitlements which deserve constitutional
protection. Denying access to these constitutional safeguards also vi-
olates procedural due process. 130 Because of express congressional in-
tent to protect debtors, the stigma of bankruptcy, and the significant
property interests and legal entitlements at stake, the procedural
safeguards provided by adversary proceedings and involuntary peti-
tions must be mandated whenever creditors seek to "consolidate" a
non-debtor into a pending bankruptcy case.
123. In re Continental Inv. Corp., 642 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1981).
124.' Salem, 29 Bankr. at 429.
125. In re SBA Factors of Miami, Inc., 13 Bankr. 99, 101 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1981).
126. Cf. Covey, 650 F.2d at 884; Salem, 29 Bankr. at 431. These cases discuss the
resulting stigma of bankruptcy.
127. 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1982).
128. See I1 U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
129. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984); FED. R. BANKR. P.
1010, 1011, 7004, 7012.
130. See cases cited supra note 17.
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SUGGESTED PROCEDURES AND CONCERNS
Adversary Proceeding Protections Must be Provided
When creditors seek to consolidate via motion, the assets and lia-
bilities of a non-debtor with those of a debtor, the bankruptcy court
should require one of two procedures. First, the court should treat
the consolidation as an adversary proceeding brought by creditors
against the non-debtor. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001
limits adversary proceedings to certain litigated matters including
proceedings in bankruptcy court "(7) to obtain an injunction or
other equitable relief, or .. .(9) to obtain a declaratory judgment
relating to any of the foregoing." 131 Substantive consolidation logi-
cally falls into either of these categories.
Alter ego status determinations and decisions to pierce the corpo-
rate veil are equitable declaratory determinations.132 Creditor mo-
tions for consolidation are requests that the court require a non-
debtor to submit its assets to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court.133 In this respect, substantive consolidation is a form of equi-
table injunctive relief. Further, consolidation results in a declaration
that a corporation has no separate existence, that non-debtors owe a
duty of repayment to the creditors of the debtor entity, and that
creditors have the right to include the assets of the non-debtor in the
debtor estate.1
3 4
Because substantive consolidation is an equitable remedy, courts
must comply with procedures governing adversary proceedings. Fail-
ure to require an adversary proceeding deprives non-debtors of a
complaint, summons, and notice of trial, procedures due process pro-
tection requires.' 35 Compliance with these rules provides a mecha-
131. Equitable relief is sought in a court with equity powers, and is composed of
injunction or specific performance instead of money damages. An injunction requires the
person to whom it is directed to do or refrain from doing a particular thing. See, e.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 65. A declaratory judgment is a declaration of the rights and duties of
parties to litigation. FED. R. Civ. P. 57.
132. Kagel v. First Commonwealth Co., 409 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (N.D. Cal.
1973).
133. See, e.g., Kheel, 369 F.2d at 845; Suhi, 348 F.2d at 869.
134. See, e.g., Meridian, 15 Bankr. at 89.
135. Receipt of a summons and complaint is considered more serious than receipt
of notice of a hearing. A summons clearly warns the party receiving it of the seriousness
of the action brought against it. In re Commercial Western Finance Corp., 761 F.2d
1329, 1337 (9th Cir. 1985) (wherein the court stated that had the trustee followed adver-
sary proceeding rules requiring a summons, complaint, and notice of trial, investors
would have been clearly warned of the serious consequences of the power he was seeking
to exercise).
nism by which non-debtor and non-debtor creditors are apprised of
the serious consequences of the substantive consolidation action. 136
Failure to file an adversary proceeding should result in dismissal of
the action by the court. Failure to dismiss the action constitutes a
reversible error of law.137
The general provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), upon which the
power to consolidate is based, do not supersede specific provisions
such as Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001. According to
several court decisions in the Ninth Circuit, where a rule exists
which states the specific procedure for the exercise of the general
equitable powers of a bankruptcy court, the specific rule applies.1 38
Where Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(7) and (9) re-
quires a complaint, summons, and trial, general provisions of 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) cannot be used to supersede this rule.13 9
Given the doubt regarding which rules should apply to substantive
consolidation matters, it is important to note that under Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9014, the court may at any time ap-
ply Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure gov-
erning adversary proceedings to a contested matter. 4 0 Since the ma-
jor problems with motion practice in the non-debtor situation exist at
the notice and hearing stages, adversary rules requiring summons,
complaint, and service of process must be applied early in the
proceeding. 141
When all parties view an issue as adversarial in nature, Part VII
rules governing adversary proceedings must apply. 42 Since substan-
tive consolidation matters are often adversarial in nature,' 43 they
should, at a minimum, be treated as an adversary proceeding at the
notice stage, giving fair notice to both the non-debtor entity and its
creditors.
Another option for bankruptcy courts would require the moving
party to first file an involuntary petition against the non-debtor, sat-
136. Commercial Western, 761 F.2d at 1337.
137. See id.
138. E.g., id. at 1336-39; In re Golden Plan, 36 Bankr. 95, 96 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1984).
139. See Commercial Western, 761 F.2d at 1336-39; see also Golden Plan, 36
Bankr. at 96. The bankruptcy court holding that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) superceded FED. R.
BANKR. P. 765, governing adversary proceedings, was reversed by the Bankruptcy Appel-
late Panel for the Ninth Circuit. The Appellate Panel held that while § 105(a) granted
bankruptcy courts the power to issue injunctions, rule 765 stated the procedure for the
exercise of the power. Id.
140, FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014.
141. Unless the court makes the rules governing adversary proceedings applicable
at a very early stage of the proceedings, there will be no summons and notice of the trial
issued and served upon the non-debtor. D.R. COWAN, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 3.19 (Supp. 11 1984).
142. E.g., In re Lifeguard Indus., 37 Bankr. 3, 4 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
143. E.g., Meridian, 15 Bankr. at 89; Crabtree, 39 Bankr. at 718.
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isfy standing requirements, and prove that the non-debtor is gener-
ally not paying its debts as they become due. The creditors could
then move for consolidation of the two pending actions after the or-
der for relief is entered and after equity interest holders and credi-
tors of both entities are provided adequate notice.
The Crabtree and Meridian courts found this procedure unneces-
sary. They stated that creditors did not have to satisfy standing re-
quirements because, as creditors of the debtor only, they probably
could not. Creditors did not have to prove non-payment of debts.144
This reasoning is both unpersuasive and constitutionally suspect. If
the party bringing the motion has no standing under 11 U.S.C. §
303, the court should not have jurisdiction to consider the matter.145
Eleven U.S.C. § 303 indicates that Congress intended to protect in-
dividuals and corporations from frivolous claims and the inevitable
stigma of bankruptcy. Congress did so by providing standing re-
quirements, imposing burdens of proof for creditors, and authorizing
debtor remedies in the event of dismissal of the petition. 46 When the
Code clearly provides that these requirements must be satisfied when
creditors seek to make an entity an involuntary debtor, decisions
such as Meridian and Crabtree seem in clear disregard of legislative
mandates and intent.
Moreover, procedural protection for involuntary debtors under 11
U.S.C. § 303 includes the right to notice by a petition and summons,
and a hearing in the form of a trial. Such protections are legal enti-
tlements which are constitutionally protected property interests. 47
Because a substantive consolidation motion denies access to these le-
gal entitlements, a deprivation of property without due process
occurs.
Finally, while 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) is a broad grant of bankruptcy
court discretion, the language of the statute is also that of limitation.
The bankruptcy court may issue only those orders necessary to carry
out the provisions of title eleven. 48 Since the provisions of title
eleven require a trial on the involuntary petition before a non-debtor
can be made a debtor, use of broad discretionary 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)
power to circumvent these provisions undermines section 105(a) it-
144. Meridian, 15 Bankr. at 95; Crabtree, 39 Bankr. at 722.
145. Cf. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984); Grove v. Mead School Dist. No.
354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1531 (9th Cir. 1985). These cases stated if the plaintiffs lack stand-
ing to bring suit, the courts lack jurisdiction to consider the cases.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(h)(i) (1982 & Supp. H 1984).
147. See cases cited supra note 17.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
self and due process of law.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy results in a deprivation of property, requiring strict
attention to due process requirements of adequate notice and hear-
ing.1 49 Notice and hearing requirements of contested involuntary pe-
titions and adversary proceedings provide adequate due process pro-
tection to parties involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. 150 As a
contested matter, a motion to amend the caption, or a motion for
substantive consolidation, provides only minimal due process protec-
tion to a non-debtor.
151
Court analysis of substantive consolidation motions is decidedly
one-sided. The greatest concern of courts is to avoid creditor
prejudice. 152 Such concern is appropriate when consolidation affects
two debtors already parties to a bankruptcy case. 5 3 However, this
analysis is misguided when a non-debtor is drawn into a pending
case. Potential prejudice to the non-debtor should be examined. Ad-
ditional procedural safeguards such as those found in an adversary
proceeding or contested involuntary petition should be mandated.1
54
Substantive consolidation can be an efficient, convenient way to
join pending cases involving related debtors. It can aid in effectuat-
ing creditor rights to repayment. However, when the doctrine is used
to join a non-debtor to a pending case without the attendant proce-
dural safeguards of an adversary proceeding or an involuntary peti-
tion, the use of consolidation is constitutionally suspect. Considera-
tions of due process, legislative intent, and the practical effects of
bankruptcy on the life of an individual or corporation, as well as the
inherent prejudice to creditors of the non-debtor, indicate that addi-
tional safeguards are needed whenever creditors seek to join an en-
tity not in bankruptcy to a pending bankruptcy case.
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